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'I'his paper presents a rnodel of a finite collection of socially related economic agents.
We assume that an agent in an economy is part of some social struc,ture in which he
might dominate some agents while he himself is dominated by other agents. We con-
sider structures in which these social relations between the agents have some special
features. Such a social structure is called a hierarchically structured population. We
identify two types of social differences between economic agents in a hierarchically
structured population. Firstly we show that the agents can be subdivided into groups
that can be ordered such that agents in `higher' groups dominate agents in `lower'
groups. Secondly we show that the communication structure between the agents, in
general, will be incomplete.
These social differences lead to different potential influences agents have on
economic processes. We introduce an index that measures this potential infiuence.
Such an index will be called a socialpower index because it measures power resulting
frorn the agent's social positions. We also give an characteriration of this social
power index. Furthermore, wc derive the rather striking result tliat under a general
uniformity condition this social power index can be viewed as the representation of
the subjective expectations of the economic agents in the hierarchy with respect to
their influence on economic processes.1
1 Introduction
Economic agents are subjects that participate in some economic organization. There-
fore, when analyzing their behaviour, we should not look at each agent isolated from
the other agents but should take account of their social relations with one another.
In many economic models, such as for examplc in Debreu (1959) or Ichiishi (1983),
econonric agents are modelled as subjects that differ from each other only with re-
spect to certain individually detcnnined characteristicw such as income, preferences,
wealth, and so on. No account is taken of the socialpositions of the economic agents
in the economic organizat,ion.
In this paper we are primarily interested in the description of social features
of economic agents. We present a model in which economic agents have different
influences on economic processes within the organization. To illustrate this point, in
a model of a perfectly competitive market organization it is assumed that no agent
has influence on the marketprices and therefore all agents take these prices as given.
In other models, such as for example the monopoly or oligopoly model, not all agents
are powerless with respecL to the prices. For arbitrary economic processes we now
assume that the agents have different direct inf}uences on these economic processes.
With this direct influence we mean the possibility to set conditions under which the
economic processes will Lake place such as, for example, the power to set the prices
under which trade with other agents will take place.
We íntroduce social or relational power as the potential influence that eco-
nomic agcnts have on economic processes resulLing frorn Lheir tiocial relations with
one another within a hierarchícal economic organization. Much work has been done
with respect to the measurement of `power' of agents in social situations. Next we
discuss some of the literature on this problem.
Talking about the `power' of economic agents in socíal situations is useless if
we do not specify what is meant with `power'. In different situations the definition
of the notion of power can differ considerably. Stippose, for example, that a group of
agents has to choose one out of several alternatíves. We can talk about the power of
an agerit as being his influence on the final decision that is taken by the group.
In cooperative game theory a situation in which a group of agents just has
to decide whether to accept or reject a certain alternative, can be represented by a
simple game. A simple game is a function that assigns to each subgroup or coalítion2
of agents the value one if this coalition can guarantee that the alternative will he
accepted ( such a coalition is called a winning coalition) and the value zero if this is
not the case. We can talk about the (voting) power of an agent participating in a
simple game as being his possibilities to turn losing coalitions into winning ones by
cooperating with these coalitions. This power can be measured by a power index.
The most famous axiomatic power indices for simple games are the .Shapley-ShuLik
index and the Banzhaf index. Axiomatizations of the Shapley-Shubik index and the
Banzhaf index respectively can be found in Dubey ( 1975) and Dubey and Shapley
(1979). Another axiomatic power index for simple games is the one introduced in
Dcegan and Packel ( 1978) or its generalization in Packel and Deegan (1980).
Simple games form a subclass of the more general collection of cooperative
games with transferable utilities or simply TU-games. A TU-game on a set of agents
is a function that assigns a real vaIue to every coalition of agents. For a particular
coalition this value represents the pay-off this coalition can attain if the agents in
the coalition cooperate. We can talk about the coalitional power of an agent in a
TU-game as being his possibilities to let coalitions earn more by cooperating with
him. Axiomatic power indices for these more general TU-games are the Shaplcy
value (Shapley ( 1953)) of which the Shapley-Shubik index is a restriction for simple
games, and the Banzhajualue for TU-games which is the generalization of the Banzhaf
index. ( An axiomatization of the Banzhaf value for TU-games can be found in Lehrer
(1988).)
In this paper we introduce a power index that measures the potential influence
of economic agents resulting from their social relations. We present a model of a rudi-
mental social organization. Such a rudimental organization is called a hierarchically
structured population, a concept that has been introduced in Cilles ( 1990b). We w-il]
distinguish two social features of economic agents in a hierarchically structured pop-
ulation. First of all we derive an ordered subdivision of the agents into groups such
that agents in `higher' groups set the conditions under which economic processes with
agents in `lower' groups will take place, i.e., agents in higher groups dominate agents
in lower groups. Such an ordered hierarchical subdivision of the agents is called an
echelon partition. It can be seen as a special kind of coalition structure as developed
and analyzed in e.g. Aumann and Drèze ( 1974), Owen ( 1977), and Winter ( 19S9).
Each group in an echelon partition is called an echelon.
The second social feature that we distinguish in our model deals with the3
communication possibilities of economic agents. In our model of a social organízation
the possibilities of communication between the agents, in general, not all pairs of
agents are able to communicate directly with one another. Thís means that there can
be pairs of agents that need other agents in order to engage in some binary economic
process. Such a limited communication structure can be represented by a graph whose
nodes represent the agents and whose edges represent these binary economic relations.
Such communication graphs are considered in, for example, Myerson (1977), Kalai,
Postlewaite and Roberts (1978), Owen (1986), and Borm, Owen and Tíjs (1990).
Both social features that we discussed above lead separately to a di(ferent type
of social power. The first source of social power of an agent is his possibility to set
the conditions under which economic processes with lower echelon agents will take
place. The second source of social power results from the limited communication
structure. Consider two agents who are not able to communicate directly with one
another. When it is possible for these two agents to communicate with each other
with the help of one or more other agents then these intermediary agents will have
some influence on the economic process that takes place between these two agents.
We will see that within the setting of a hierarchically structured population both
sources of social power of an agent are related.
We assume that the trade processes in a hierarchically structured population is con-
sisting of two subsequent stagcs. In the first stage an agent chooscs onc of his dom-
inating agents as the one with whom he is engaging into a binary economic (trade)
process. Secondly, he actually starts this economic process. This means that an
agent only uses a selection of the communica,tion lines with these dominating agents.
Which communication lines actually will be used, is described by a special kind of hi-
erarchically structured population indicated as an echelon tree. In general there exist
more than one echelon tree in a particular hierarchically structured population from
which eventually only one emerges. The social power of an agent clearly depends
on which situation eventually will occur. Because, given a particular hieracchically
structured population, we do not know which echelon tree eventually will occur, the
social power in a hierarchically structured population is in fact a potential feature of
the agents in the population.
We introduce a social power index as a function that mcasures the potential
social power that economic agents in a hierarchically structured population have over4
the economic relations on which they set the conditions.' Aíter the introduction of
a social power index we give a specific example, that we indicate as the BG-index.
This BG-index has seminally been introduced in Gilles (1988). We show that the
BG-index can be interpreted as a social power index which measures the social power
in a situation in which each echelon tree is given equal probability of occurrence. '1'his
can be regarded as an oójective interpretation or characterization of the BG-index.
Additionally we give a subjective characterization of the BG-index. Before
giving this subjective analysis we introduce some descriptive concepts, indicating
how the economic agents focus at the social or hierarchical power structure in the
population. For each agent we derive a probability distribution over the echelon trees
representing the agent's expectation about which echelon tree will occur. Given such
a probability distribution for an agent we introduce a subjective social power indea
that measures the social power as it is expected by this agent. We derive that under
some uniformity condition the average of the subjective social power indices over all
agents is equal to the BG-index. This is a generalization of a result as stated in
van den Brink (1989). It shows that social power indices, which can be regarded
as "objective" distribution rules of soc,ial power, can be founded on "subjective"
considerations.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce and analyze the
notion of a hierarchically structured population. In particular we identify the two
social features of the agents in such a hierarchical organization and discuss the two
sources of social power that arise from these social features. Furthermore we describe
how the echelon trees in a hierarchically structured population can be constructed.
In Section 3 the concept of a social power index as a measure of social power is
introduced and we present the I3G-index as a specific examplc~ of such a sucial fiower
inclc~x. Wc also givc~ an objc~cl.ivc intc~rprctal,ion of thc~ II(~-in~lc,x.
In Section 4 we introduce the concepts which describe the subject.ive views of
the agents with respect to the power structure in a hierarchically structured popula-
tion. Furthermore we give a subjective interpretation of the BG-iudex.
Finally, in Section 5 we give an exarnple that illustrates the object,ive and
subjective intcrpretations of the 13G-index.
We emphasize that in this paper we only consider the social features of eco-
'We remark that this number does not have to be an integer. The main reason for this is that
many agents are potentially dominated by more than one agents in the population.5
nomic agents. A next step will be to model economic agents that have individual as
well as social features. In t.his respect we refer to, for example, Cilles, Owen and van
den Brink (1990) where a hierarchical social structure like the one considered in this
paper limits the cooperation possibilities of agents endowed with individual abilities.
For a study of the BG-index in a more general setting we refer to van den Brink and
Cilles (1990).
2 Hierarchically structured populations
First we introduce some notational conventions. [n the sequel N-{ 1, ..., n} denotes
a finite set of econornic. agents. For every i E N and every correspondence S: N~ 2N
we define
so :- {i}
and, recursively, for every k E N, where N-{ 1, 2, ...} denotes the set of natural
numbers, we define
Sk([) -- U S(7) -~ Sk i(7)-
)ESk-~(i) )ES(i)
Note that Sl - S. The main tool in the decription of a hierarchically structured
population is a correspondence S: N~ 2N, which assigns to every agent i E N a
collection S(i) C N of agents, who are dominated directly by agent i. The agents in
Sk(i), k 1 2 then are dominated indirectly by i. Formally this is done as follows.
Definition 2.1 A correspondence S: N--~ 2N is a successor mapping orc N ij it
satisfies the jollowing two conditions.
(i) S is acyclic, i.e., jor every agent i E N it holds that:
~
i ~ .S`(2) :- ~ Sk(2).
k-1
(ii) For every pair oj agents i, j E N there is some h E N such that
{i, j} C [S(h) U {h}].
7'he collection oj all successor mappings on N is denoted by SN.6
The first condition stated in Definition 2.1 requires that an agent cannot dominate
himself (neither directly nor indirectly). The second condition says that for each pair
of agents it holds that either one of the two dominates the other, or there is another
agent that domínates both.
In this paper we interpret the "domination" of economic agents as follows.
If i E N and j E S(i), then agent i sets the conditions under which some binary
economic process between agent j and himself has to take place. (For example, i sets
the prices under which he and j can exchange commodities.) The agents in S(ij are
called the potential successors of i according to S. If agent j is a potential successor
of i t,hen j is called a potential predecessor of i according to S. The collection of
all potential predecessors of i acc,ording to S is denoted by S-1(i), i.e., S-1(i) :-
{j E N ~ i E S(j)}. A pair (N,S), where N is a finite set of economic agents and
S is a successor mapping on N is called a hierarchically structured population on N.
The remainder of this section is devoted to the analysis of hierarchically structured
populations.
Recursively we can introduce the sets I,k, k E N U{0}, as follows
Lo -- ~




We now can prove the following theorem.
Theorem 2.2 Let S E SN. There exists a number M E N such that { I,1, ..., L,~~ } is
a partition of N consisting of non-empty sets only. Furthermoi~e, hn~ is a singlefon.
'I'he proof of this t.heorem can be found in section 6. 1'he number M is called the
length of the hierarchically structured population ( N, S) and is denoted by l(.S). The
agent io E L~y is the unique agent that is not dominated and is called the leader
in (N, S). The partition 1; -{G1i .. ., L,y} is called the echelan partiti.on of (N, S)
and can be seen as a hierarchical subdivision of the agents in N induced by S. The
elements in the echelon partition are called echelons.
I3esides this hierarchical subdivision, a successor mapping S also describes the
possihilil,ies of thc~ age~nts t,o c-ommunicate with c~a.ch othc~r, i.e., thc~ir CfO~lo77L2c rcla-
lions. These communication possibilities are given by the commu~aication structure
R, which is defined by7
R:- {{i, j} ~ i E N, j E S(i)}.
We have distinguished two social features of economic agents in a hierarchically struc-
tured population, namely their position in the echelon partition and their commu-
nication possibilities. These two social characteristics are related in the following
way.
Theorem 2.3 Let S E SN with l(S) - M, and let ~-{L1i...,LM} and R respec-
tively be the echelon partition and lhe com~nunication structure of (N, S).
1. For every 1 G k,1 C M and every pair of agents i E Lk, j E L~ it holds that:
i E S(j) if and only if {i, j} E R and k G 1;
2. For every 2 G k G M and every agent i E Lk there exists an agent j E Lk-1
such that {i, j} E R;
~. For every 1 G k G M- 1 and every agent i E Lk there exists an agent j E
~JMk~I L~ such that {i, j} E R.
The proof of this theorem can also be found in section 6. Condition 1 in Theorem
2.3 says that if two agents are directly related to each other, then they must be
part of different echelons and the agent in the higher echelon dominates the lower
echelon agent. In this way the economic relations in R also can be seen as dominance
relations. Together with this condition, condition 2 says that if an agent is not part
of the lowest echelon, then there must be an agent in the echelon right below him
that he dominates. Together with condition 1, condition 3 says that if an agent is
not part of the highest echelon, then he must be dominated by another agent. The
following example illustrates the concepts introduced so far.
Example 2.4 Consider the hierarchically structured population (N, S), where N-
{ 1, ..., 6} and the successor mapping S is given by:
S(1) - {2,3,4}, S(2) - {4}, S(3) - {5}, S(4) - {6}, S(5) - 0, S(6) - 0.






Figure 1: (N, R)
The communication st,ructure R of (N, S) is given by:
R - {{1,2},{1,3},{1,4},{2,4},{3,5},{4,6}}.
The communication graph (N, R) can be drawn in a way such that, agents belonging
to the same echelon are placed on the same horizontal line (see figure 1).
Thus far we have described a special kind of social organization structure by a hierar-
chically structured population. How a particular hierarchically structured population
arises might depend on individual features, on social features, or on a combination of
both. Individual features that might determine the hierarchically structured popu-
lation are, for example, the initial endowments of the agents. An examp]e of hierar-
chically structured populations that depend on social features are the ones that are
determined by networks (See Gilles ( 1990a) or Gilles and Ruys ( 1990).) In this paper
we do not address this problem but just take a hierarchically structured population
as given.
Different positions in a hierarchically structured population lead to different
possibilities to influence economic processes. The influence that an agent has on the
economic processes resulting from his social characteristics is refered to as his social
power. It is clear that the direct influence an agent has on his relations with his
potential successors is some source of social power. As mentioned in the introduction
Lltc~n~ is a. Nc~cund sonrcv~ crf soc~ia.l trcrwc,r tlrat a.riYC~s front Lhc~ lintitc~cl t~otunnrnic'ation
sl,ructurc in a hic~rarr.hicxlly structurc~d populatiun. ~l~hcumut 2.3 dircctly yic.lcls tlu.
following result,.9
Corollary 2.5 Let S E SN. Then the pair (N, R) is a connected graph, i.e., for
every pair of agents i, j E N, with i~ j, there ezists a finite sequence cl, ..., c,,, E N
such that ei - i, c,,, - j, and {ck,cktl} E R for every 1 C k C m- I.
A sequence cl, ..., c,,, as described in Corollary 2.5 is called a communication path
between i and j. If two agents i, j E N cannot communicate directly then, according
to Corollary 2.5, i and j can communicate indirectly through one or more other
agents. These intermediary agents in the communication process between i and
j have some influence on the economic process that takes place between i and j.
This influence is the second source of social power an agent has in a hierarchically
structured population.
We argue that both sources of social power of an agent are in some sense
identical within the setting of a hierarchically structured population. This follows
Irom the following lemma.
Lemma 2.6 Let S E SN and let R 6e its communication structure. For all agents
i, j E N, i~ j, there ezísts a sequence cl, ..., c,,, and a positive integer T C m such
that:
1. c~ - i
4. ck E S(c~tl) for k- 1,...,T - 1
3. ckfl E S(ck) for k- T, ..., m- 1
4. Cm - .Í
Proof of this lemma can be found in section 6. The agent cT in a communication
path as described in Lemma 2.6 is called the tapman on that communication path.
Lemma 2.6 says that there is a communication path between each pair of agents
i, j E N such that each agent on that communication path, except the topman,
dirccts himself to one of his potential predecessors. That is, the intermediary agents
within such a communication path are dominating each other in an order such that
there is a unique agent at the top of this communication chain.
Not all communication paths between two agents in a hierarchically structured
population need to be of the form as in Lemma 2.6. However, the following discussion10
implies that communication paths other than those described in Lemma 2.6 will not
bc used.
We~ assinui~ t.hat., in ~~asi~ so~ni~ ~~~~onomic ~irocess takcs placn c~twecn Lhe ag~~nts
in N, thcu c~arh agcnt c house~s oni~ of hiy putential ~iredi~icssors as thc onc witli whoni
he is going to engage in a binary economic process. Such an organization structure
can be described by a function, the predecessorfunetion.
Definition 2.7 Let S E SN and let the echelon partition of (1~', S) be given 6y F-
{Lr,...,LM}, where M - 1(S).
A function t: N`L,~,r --~ N`Lr is a predecessor function in S iffor everyi E N`L,y
it holds that t(i) E S-r(i).
A pair(N,T) is an echelon tree in (N, S) iJT E SN is such that the correspondence
t: N`L,y -a N`Lr given by t(i) - T-r(i), for a.ll i E N`L,y is a predecessorfunction
in S.
The collection of all correspondences T such that (N,T) is an echelon tree in (N, S)
is denoted by Ts.
For every hierarchically structured population (N, S) it holds that Ts C S~`. The
agent t(i) is the potential predecessor to which i E N`G,yr directs himself if t is t.he
predecessor function that describes the situation that actually occurs. This agent
t(i) is called the predecessor of i according to t. It is easy to see that if (N,T) is an
echelon tree with communication structure W, then the graph (N,W) is a tree. [n
such a tree there exists exactly one communication path between each pair of agents
and all these paths are of the form as described in Lemma 2.6. In this way the power
of an agent resulting from his possibilities to let other agents communicate with one
another also depends on which agents are his potential successors.
We remark here that the echelon partition of (N,T) with T E Ts need not
be the same as the echelon partition of (N, S) itself. This is shown in the following
example.
Example 2.8 Consider the hierarchically structured population (N, S) given in Ex-
ample 2.4.
Agent 4 is the only agent who has more than one potential predecessor, i.e., agent 4
is the only agent who can choose to which agent he is going to direct himself. There-
fore there are exactly two predecessor functions in S. These are tr: {2, 3, A, 5, 6} -.
{1, 2, 3, 4} which is given by:11
( N, W, )
L4 L4
LZ L2
L1 5 f 6~ ~ 2 Li
(N,W2)
Figure 2: communication graphs of the echelon trees in (N, S)
t,(2) - i,t,(3) - l,t,(4) - l,t,(5) - 3,t,(6) - 4
and t2: {2, 3, 4, 5, 6} --~ { 1, 2, 3, 4} which is given by:
tz(2) - 1, t~(3) - 1, t~(4) - 2, t2(5) - 3, t~(6) - 4.
The echelon partition ~1 and communica,tion structure Wl of the echelon tree belong-
ing to tl are given by:
~1 - {{2,5,6},{3,4},{1}}
W1 - {{1,2},{1,3},{1,4},{3,5},{4,6}}
and those of the echelon tree belonging to t2 are given by:
~2 - {{5,6},{3,4},{2},{1}} - f
W2 - {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2,4}, {3,5}, {4,6}}.
The communication graphs of these echelon trees are given in figure 2.
Note that if agent 4 chooses agent 1 as his predecessor then the echelon partition
~1 that actually occurs has one echelon less than the echelon partition ~ of (N, S).
If agent 4 chooses agent 2 as his final predecessor, then the echelon partition that
actually occurs is the same as the echelon partition of (N, S): ~2 -~.la
It is easy to see now why the members of S(i) and S-1(i) respectively are called
the potential successors and potential predecessors of i in (N, S). If a potential
successor of i has more potential predecessors besides i, then it is not known whether
this potential successor actually will direct himself to i. The social power an agent
has in a hierarchically structured population clearly depends on which echelon tree
eventually will occur.
3 Social power indices
In this section we introduce the notion of a social power index that measures the
(potential) social power of economic agents in a hierarchically structured population.
In the previous section we indicated two sources of social power within the setting
of a hierarchically structured population. We argued that, for an agent i E N, both
sources of social power depend on which agents he dominates directly. Therefore, the
social power index that we have in mind should tell us in which way tlre power over all
dominated agents is distributed over the agents in N. The fact that in a hierarchically
structured population the leader is the only agent that is not dominated leads us to
the following definition of a social power index.
Definition 3.1 A social power index on N is a function cp: N x SN ~ R~ such
that for every S E SN it holds that
~ cp(i, S) - ~N - 1.
~EN
The power over the ~N - 1 dominated economic agents can be distributed in various
ways as long as this power distribution satisfies Definition 3.1. Here we turn to the
analysis of one particular socia] power index, the BG-index.
From the discussion in the previous section it follows that the social power of
an agent i E N in a hierarchically structured population (N, S) depends on which
c,chc~lon t.rc~c~ c~vc~ntrrally will occ~rrr. 'I'hia dc~pc~ncls on whic-h onc~ of I,hcir potc.nt.ial
prc~dcawsors thc agc~nl,s in N` l,iy choosc as t.hcir tn~eclc~cc~s,or. lu Lhc 13C-inclcx
we assume that each agent (except thc topmau) chooses each oue of his potential
predecessors as his predecessor with equal probability.
Definition 3.2 The BG-index is the function BG: N x SN -a R~, which for every




where a(j) :- ~S-~(j) for every j E N`L,tf.
The BG-index of agent i in a hierarchically structured population (N, S) counts
~s1, (i~ to the social power value of i for each potential successor j of agent i. In other
words, in the BG-index the power over a dominated agent is equally distributed over
all his potential predecessors. This expresses the fact that nothing is known about
the choices of the agents which potential predecessor they choose as their predecessor.
This leads us to the following characterization of the BG-index.
Theorem 3.3 A funetion cp: N x SN -~ R~ is equal to the f3G-index if and only íf
it satisfies the following three conditions:
(i) For every hierarchically structured population (N, S) it holds that
~ ~p(i, S) - ~N - 1.
~EN
(ii) For every hierarchically structured population (N, S) and every agent i E N
it holds that
cp(i,S) 1~{j E S(i) ~ a(j) - 1}.
(iii) For every hierarchically structured population (N, S) and every agent i E N
it holds that
1
~P(~,S) - ~Ts ~~s~P(z~T)-
From the first condition it follows that the BG-index indeed is a social power index
as introduced in Definition 3.1. The second condition says that an agent at least
has full power over all his potential successors that have to direct themselves to him
because they have no other potential predecessor. The third condition says that the
BG-index for an arbitrary hierarchically structured population (N, S) is equal to the
averagcof thesc indices over all echclon trces (N,7') in (N,S).
PROOF OF THEOREM 3.314
h'irst we will prove that thc I3G-index satisfies the three condil.ions statcd in the
theorem.
Suppose that S E SN and let { Lr ,..., L,y } and R respectively be the echelon parti-
tion and the communication structure of (N, S). Then
1 1
(i) ~ 13G(i, S) - ~ ~ - ~ ~ - ~N - 1.
~EN iEN jES(i) ~(~) jEN`L~y iES-~(j) a(~)
This shows that the BG-indcx satisfies the first condition.
(rr) For every i E N it holds that
BG(i,S) -~ 1 1~ 1 -~{J E S(z) ~~(3) - 1}.
jES(i) ~(.7) - ~es~~~ 0(7)
v(i)-1
This shows that the BG-index satisfies the second condition.
(iii) Let T E Ts. Then
~7,-i(i) 1 for every i E N~ L~y
- 0 for the leader i- io E LM
Then it is clear that
BG(i,T) - ~ ~T~i(j) -
~T(i)
jET(i)
Let 7S(i, j) :- {T E TS ~ j E T(i)}. It is easy to see that Íor every i E N and
for every potential successor j E S(i) it holds that TTS' - o~j). Then we
may deduce that
1 1
13G(i,S) - ~ - - ~ ~Ts(i,j)
lES(i) a(,) t S jES(i)
- 1 ~ ~T(i) - 1 ~ BG(i,T),
tS TETs tS TETs
where ts :- ~75. This shows that the BG-index also satisfies the third
condition.15
Now let ep: N x SN ~ R} be a function that satisfies the three conditions. We next
show that it has to be the BG-index.
From thc first. two condit.ions it casily follows that for cach S E SN and evcry T E 7s
it holds that
cp(i,T) - ~T(z).
From the third condition it then follows that for S E SN:
1 1
~P(i,S) - - ~ ~T(i) - - ~ ~7s(i,j)
ts TETs ts iES(i)
- ~ 1 - BG(i, S)
JES(i) ~(~)
This implies that if cp: N x SN -~ Rn satisfies the three conditions, then it must be
equal to the BG-index.
Q.E.D.
It follows from this proof that the first two conditions uniquely determine the BG-
index for echelon trees. According to the third c.ondition, the BG-ind~x measures the
potential social power oí economic ageuts in a hierarchically structured population
(N, S) if we assume that each echelon tree occurs with the same probability. Therefore
we might see the BG-index as an objective power index which distributes the social
power in some "fairn way. The characterization given in Theorem 3.3 is called the
objective characterization of the BG-index.
4 A subjective approach to the BG-index
In this section we show that the BG-index also can be seen as a subjective social
power index, i.e., as an index that measures social power from the viewpoint of the
individual agents in the hierarchically structured population.
Consider a particular hierarchically structured (N, S) and an agent i E N`L~.
If a potential successor j E S(i) has more potential predecessors besides i, then it is
not known whether j actually directs himself to i. We suppose that each agetit has
certain expectations about which ones of his potential successors eventually directs
themselves to him. These subjective cxpec.tations of the agents are given by a social
expectation function.16
Definition 4.1 Let S E SN. A function tes: N x N-~ (0, 1] is a social expectation
function for (N, S) iffor every i E N the following two conditions are satisf:ed:
(~) f~s(z,7) - 0 if7 ~ S(i);
(ii) ~s(i, j) - 1 if j E S(i) with a(j) - 1.
The probability agent i E N gives to the occurrence of an echelon tree such that he is
the predecessor of agent j is given by ~s(i, j). Agent i must expect that he will never
be the predecessor of an agent who is no potential successor of him. Furthermore i
must expect that he will be the predecessor of a potential successor j E S(i) with
certainty if he is the only potential predecessor of j. It is clear that if i E LI then
~S(i, j) - 0 for all j E N. If j E L,y then ~s(i, j) - 0 for all i E N.
Clearly the choicesoCpredecessors by all agents in N`!,M result in a particiilar
echelon tree. Using the social expectation function we can, for each agent in N, derive
a probability distribution over 7s. Consider a particular echelon tree (N, T) in (N, S),
and an agent i E N. It is easy to see that if T(i) ~~ then the probability agent i
gives to the occurrence of an echelon tree in which he is the predecessor of all agents
in T(i) is given by
~ ~s(z,7).
jET(i)
For each one of the agents j E S(i) `T(i), agent i gives probability 1-~s(i, j) to the
occurrence of an echelon tree in which he is not the predecessor of j. We assume that
agent i expects that all other potential predecessors of j have equal probability to be
the predecessor of j. Because in these cases j has [~S-1(j) - 1] ? 1 other potential
predecessors besides i, the probability i gives to the occurrence of an echelon tree in




Finally we assume that each agent i E N expects that Cor cach agent j who is
no potential successor of i it holds that all potential preclecessors of j have equal
probability ~s~,(~) to be the predecessor of j. This results in the following functions
that yield the expectation of agent i about which echelon tree will occur.17
Definition 4.2 Lct .S' E SN, lrl tr,ti Gr n.YOr'ial crprr-Inlinn farnr.rinn jor (N, S) aiid
let i E N. The expectation distribution of agent i induced by ps is the functíon
p;:Ts -~ [0, 1] that is given by
pi(T )- ~ l~s(Z,.l ) ~ 1- l~s(Zi.7) T7 1 (`l)
jET(i) jES(i)`T(i) ~(g) - 1 jEN`[1S(li)uLb] ~(~)
for every T E Ts.
It can be verified that for each agent i E N it holds that p;(T) ~ 0 for every
T E Ts and ~ p;(T) - 1. Thus the function p;:TS -; [0, 1] describes a probability
TETs
distribution over TS. This probability distribution reflects agent i's expectation about
which echelon tree will occur.
We will illustrate the agent's expectations about the occurrence of echelon
trees by discussing three specific types of social expectation functions, namely the
cases of pessimistic, neutral, and optimistic expectations. To analyze these cases
properly we take a fixed hierarchically structured population (N, S).
We say that agent i has pessimistic expectations about his power over his potential
successors if the social expectation function ps satisfies:
1 if j E S(i) and v(j) - 1
ps(Z'~) - 0 else
From eyuation ( 2) it follows tliat in this case agent i's expectation distribution is
such that for every T E TS it holds that
0 if{jET(i)~v(j)~1}~0
~ o(j)-~ jj o(j) if {j E T(i) ~ v(j) ~ 1} - 0
jES(i)`T(~) jEN`[S(i)uLly]
This shows that if agent i has pessimistic expectations about his power over his
potential successors, then he gives zero probability to the occurrence of all eclielon
trees in which he is the predecessor of at least one of his potential successors who
have more potential predecessors besides himself. If NS(i) :- {T E Ts ~ {7 E T(i) ~
a(j) ~ 1} -~}, then we can verify that for every T E NS(i) it holds that
7, - 1 1 1
p,( )
;ES(~T(i) o(j) -1 jEN~[~)uLMI ~(j) - ~NS(i)'18
This shows that agent i gives equal positive probability to the occurrence of all echelon
trees in which he is not the predecessor of any of his potential successors who have
more than one potential predecessors.
We say that agent i has neutral expectations about his power over his potential
successors if the socia[ expectation function ~s satisfies
1
ps(t,~) - ~(~) for all j E S(i).
From equation (2) it follows that in this case agent i's expectation distribution is
such that for every T E Ts it holds that
7~7 1 1 Pi( ~') - 11 - -
jEN`l,,w ~(.T ) ~S ~
wherc ls :- ~Ts. 7~he e~quation above asscrts that if age~ut i has nc,utral expectatiuns,
then he gives equal probability of occurrence to each echelon tree in (N, S).
Finally, we say that agent i has optimistic expectations about his power over his
potential successors if the social expectation function ~s satisfies
~s(i, j) - 1 for all j E S(i).
h'rom equation (2) it (ollows that in this case agent i's expectation distributiou is
such that for every T E Ts it holds that
0 if T(i) ~ S(i)
Pi(T)-{ jj o(j) if T(i) - s(i).
jEN`[S(i)uLM]
This implies that in case agent i has optimistic expectations about his power over his
potential successors, then i gives zero probability to the occurrence of an echelon tree
in which he is not the predecessor of all his potential successors. If Ds(i) :- {T E
Ts ~ T(i) - S(i)}, then we can verify that for every T E Ds(i) it holds that
Pi(T) - ~ 1 - 1
jEN`[S(i)uLM] a(') ~DS(i).
'1'hus we may conclude that in case of optitnistic expectations agent i gives eyual
positive probability to the occurrence of all echelon trees in which he is the predecessor
of all his potential successors.19
Suppose that cp: N x SN -~ R} is a social power index as de,fined in Definition 3.1. For
an echelon tree (N, T) the function y~(., T): N -~ Rt can be seen as a social power
index belonging to echelon tree (N,T) which measures social power in a situation
that actually might occur. Given the social power index for all echelon trees we can
define a subjective social power index which measures social power from the agent's
point oí view.
Definition 4.3 Let S E SN, let ps 6e a social expectation funclion Jor (N, S) and
let ep: N x SN ~ Rt 6e a social powcr indez. Furthermore, lr.t ph be the expectation
distribulion of agent h E N indur.ed 6y ps. Agent h's subjective expectation of ~p
is the Junction Eh(cp): N-~ R~ which is given 6y
Eh(cp)(i) -~ pn(T)y~(i,T) for every i E N.
TETs
Thus Eh(cp)(i) measures the social power of agent i according to agent h. With the
assurnptions as rnade in the previous definitions we in fact have constructed a model
of subjective expectation patterns with respect to social power in the setting of a
hierarchically structured organization of economic processes. With the use of this
model we are able to give an approach to the BG-index, which is based on subjective
cxpectations of the agents in t,hc orga.nization. The following rcsult rcmarkably states
that uniform expectations with respect to social power, lead to the sarne rule for
distributing social powcr, namely thc BG-index.
Theorem 4.4 The function ~: N x SN --~ R} is equal to the BG-index ij and only
if the following three conditions are satisfied:
(' )
(i
For every hierarchically structured population (N, S) it holds that
~ cp(i, S) - ~N - 1.
iEN
) I~i~r rvcry IticrarchiraUystructurrd popululiou (N,.S~ un~l rvrry agcnl i E N
it holds that
cp(i,S) ?~{j E S(i) ~ o(j) - 1}.
(iii) For every hierarchácally structured population (N, S) and every social expec-
tation function lrs such that Jor every j E N`LM and every i E S-r(j)20





whene Eh(cp) is gilvten by Defiizition 4.3.
Conditions 1 and 2 are similar to the first two conditions in the objective characteriza-
tion of the BG-index given in Theorem 3.3. So, again these two conditions determine
a social power index for each echelon tree in (N, S). The third condition then says
that if, for each agent j E N` L~y, it holds that all his potential predecessors in
(N, S) have the same subjective expectations regarding the power over him, then the
BG-index is equal to the average of the subjective expectations of this rule yo over all
agents. Therefore, Theorem 4.4 is a subjective characterization of the BG-index.
PROOF OF THEOREM 4.4
First we will prove that the BG-index satisfies the three conditions.
Because the first two conditions are the same as in Theorem 3.3, it follows that the
BG-index satisfies these conditions.
Let S E SN. Suppose that for all j E N`L,y it holds that:
!zs(z,,7) - lzs(7), for all i E S-1(~).
Consider a particular agent i E N.
First we wíll determine Eh(BG)(i), for all h E N. Let j E S(i), and let TS(i, j) :-
{T E 7s ~ j E T(i)}. Then
Eh(i,j) ~- ~ Ph(T)
TE7s(~~7)
is the probability agent h gives to the occurrence of an echelon tree in which agent
i is the predecessor of agent j. Now there have to be considered exactly three cases
with respect to agent h E N:
l. Supposc h - i.
'1'hcn it immediately follows tliat:21
Ei(i,j) - l~s(i,j) - hs(j)- (3)
2. Suppose h E S-'(j) ~{i}.
This means that h is another potential predecessor of j. Then h gives prob-
ability 1-~s(j) to the occurrence of an echelon tree in which he is not the
predecessor of j. We assumed that agent h expects that all other potential pre-
decessors of j have equal probability to be j's predecessor. Therefore ít holds
that:
Eh(z,~) - 1- hs(~) if h E S-1(~) `{i}.
~(j) - 1
(4)
3. Suppose h E N` S-' (j).
'I~hus h is not a potcntial predcccssor of j. We assurned t,hat,, if j is no potential
successor of h, then h expects that j will direct himself to each one of his
potential predecessors with equal probability. Therefore it holds that:
En(z,j) - Q(j)
if h E N`S-I(j)- (5)
This holds for all potential successors j of agent i, so from (3), (4), (5) and the third
conditíon the theorem it follows that for all h E N:
En(BC)(i) - ~ Pn(T)BG(z,T) - ~ ~ Pn(T)
TETs jES(i) TETs(i,j)
~ ps(j) if h - i
jES(i)
- ~ Eh(i,j) -
~. 1-l~ j ,} ~ ' ~ jES(i)
jES( ) S(i) ~(j)-1 jES(i)`S(h) o(j)
]f Il. 2
Next we establish the following facts:
~ If j E S(h), h ~ i, then Q(j) ~ 1.
~ A potential successor j of agent i has Q(j) - 1 other potential predecessors
besides i.22
~ There are n - o(j) agents in N who are no potential predecessor of j, where
n :- ~N.
With this we can determine the following
~ Eh(BG)(i) - E;(BG)(i) ~- ~ Eh(BG)(i)
hEN hEN`{i}
- ~ f~s(j) ~ ~ I ~ 1 -~s(j) } ~
(1 I jES(i) hEN~{~} `jES(h)nS(i) ~(~) - 1 jES(i)~S(h) ~`~)
(~(7) - 1)(1 - hs(.!)) ~ n - a(7)
- ~ l~s(J) } ~ ~
jES(i) ~ES(~) ( ~(~) - ~) iES(i) ~(~)
o(j)~1




,~~ ?(7) } ,~~ ~(.l) - j~i~?(7)
o(i)-~ o(j)~~
(6)
P:quation (6) immediately implies that
~ Eh(BG)(i) - ~ 1 - BG(i, S).
hEN ~N .ÍES(i) a(') -
This holds for every agent i E N, and thus we are able to conclude that the BG-index
satisfies the third condition.
Next let cp: N x SN -f R~ be a function that satisfies the three conditions.
From the first two conditions it follows that for each S E SN and every T E Ts it
holds that:
~p(i,T) - ~T( -BGzT
) - jET(i) ~T-1(j)
- ( ~, ).
1
n
From this it íollows that23
~ ~~A(~)(Z) ~ ~ Ph(' )~(Zi ~ )
hEN hEN "I'ETs
~N - ~N
~ ~ Ph(T)RC(i~T) ~ Eh(BG)(i)
hEN TETs hEN
- ~N - ~N ~
With condition 3 it then follows that for every S E SN and for every social expectation
func-t,ion ~eti such that for every agent. j E N` I,,~r and for every i E .S-t(j) it holds
that Eis(i, j) -~s(j) (Ils(J) E [~, 1]), it holds that
~ Eh(BC)(z)
hEN
cP(z, S) - ~N .
From Equation ( 6) it is easily established that cp is equal to the BG-index.
Q.E.D.
5 An example
In this section we give an example which illustrates the objective and subjective
interpretations of the BG-index.
Example 5.1 Consider the hierarchically structured population (N, S), where N-
{ 1, ..., 7} and the successor mapping S is given by:
S(1) -{2,3,4,5}, S(2) - 0, S(3) - 0, S(4) -{2,6}, S(5) -{3,7},
S(s) - 0, S(7) - 0.




The communication graph (N, R) belonging to (N, S) is given in figure 3 in which
the black dots are the agents in the second echelon L2 and the ringed dot is the agent
in the highest echelon L3. The BG-index of (N, S) is given by:
Bc(., s) -(a,o,o, l2,1 z,o,o),24
4
cb b 7
Figure 3: Example 5.1
where BG(., S) :- (BG(1, S), ..., BG(7, S)). The only agents that have a choice
possibility with respect to their predecessor are the agents 2 and 3. They both have
two potential predecessors and therefore there are four echelon trees in (IV, S). These
four echelon trees (N, 7k) are given in the first column of table 1.
Consider the first echelon tree. According to condition 2 in Theorem 3.3 it
must hold that ~p(., Ti ) ~(4, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0). Together with condition 1(~;i ~p(i, T~ )-
Fi) this implies that equality holds and ~p(i,Ti) - BG(i,T~), with BG(i,T~) -~T~(i).
In the second c,olurnn oí table 1 we give the values of tk(z), i E{1, 4, 5}, ~ E
{1,...,4}, where tk(i) :- ~Tk(i). (It is clear that tk(i) - 0 for all i E{2,3,6,7}.)
4
Now it is easy to verify that for every agent i E N it holds Lhat ~ ~ 4' - BG(i, S).
k-1
This illustrates Theorem 3.3.
In order to illustrate Theorem 4.4 we need to give the subjective expectations of the
agents with respect to the power structure. Because the ageuts 2, 3, 6, and 7 are
part of the lowest echelon it follows from Definitions 4.2 and 4.3 that
Eh(BG)(i) - BG(i, S) - 0 for all i E{2, 3, 6, 7} and all h E N. (7)
'I'herefore the only agents of interest are the agents 1, 9 and 5. In the last three
columns of table 1 we give the probability distributions representing the expectations
about the occurrence of echelon trees of the agents 1, 4 and 5 in the case they all
have pessimistic, neutral, or optimistic expectations.
Agent 4 has one potential successor for which it is not certain that he will
direct himself to 4, namely agent 2. In the case of pessimistic expextations therefore,
525
probability distributions
in the case of
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4 5 (1, 3, 2) '- 0 0
2 1 '- '-




4 5 (2, 2, 2) 0 1 0 '- '- 1 4 4 4 ' ~ '- 2 2
Ó 7
Table 1: Example 5.126
agent 4 gives zero probability to the occurrence of an echelon tree in which he is the
predecessor of agent 2. These are Lhe second and fourth echelon trees. The other two
echelon trees both are given probability 2 oí occurrence from agent 4.
Similarly agent 5 gives zero probability of occurrence to the first and second
echelon tree and probability 2 to the occurrence of both the third and fourth echelon
tree.
Agent I has two potential successors with more than one potential predeces-
sors, namely agents 2 and 3. Therefore agent 1 gives probability one to the occurrence
of thr fourth echelon tree, which is t,he only one in which he is not the prcdecessor of
cither 2 or 3. ~'hc ol.her echelon Lrccs are given probabilit,y zero from agenL 1.
Next we are able to give the subjective expectations of the BG-index for the
agents 1, 4 and 5 in the case of pessimistic expectations.
E, (BG) - (2, 0, 0, 2, 2, 0, 0)
l;q(l~C:) - ~(~,O,U, 1, I,0,0) ~ ~ (;},0,0, 1,'1,0,0) - (:f~ ,0,0, I, I ~ ,0,0)
l l l 'l
F,5(BG) - 2(4,0,0, ], 1,0,0) -}- 2(3,0,0,2, 1,0,0) -( 32,0,0, 12, 1,0,0)




~N - (3,0,0,12, 2, , ) - (., )-
Thus condition 3 of Theorem 4.4 is satisfied.
In the case of neutral expectations all agents give equal probability of occurrence 4
to each echelon tree. Then
E,(BG) - Eq(BG) - Es(BG) -(3, 0, 0,12,12, 0,0) - BG(., S),
and thus the conditions of Theorern 4.4 are satisfied.
In the case of optimistic expectations the ageuts give zerv probability to the occur-
rence oí each echelon tree in which they are not the predecessors of all their potential
successors. For agent 4 and 5 this means that they give probability 2(respectively 0)
t,o the occurrence of each echelon t,ree to which they give probability zero (respectively
2) in the case of pessirnistic expectations.27
probability distributions
in the case of




T, (3,0) 0 1 2 ? 1 0
T2 (2,1) 1 0 2 z 0 1
Table 2: Example 5.2
The only echelon tree in whictt agent 1 is the predecessor of all his potential
successors is the first echelon tree and therefore agent 1 gives probability one to the
occurrence of this echelon tree and probability zero to the other echelon trees. The
subjective expectations of the BG-index for the agents 1, 4 and 5 in the optimistic
case are given by
Er(BG) - (4,0,0, l, l,o,o),
E,(BG) - 2(3,0,0,2, 1,0,0) -~ 2(2,0,0,2,2,0,0) -(22,0,0,2, 12,0,0),
ES(BG) - 2(3,0,0,1,2,0,0) -~ 2(2,0,0,2,2,0,0) - (22,0,0, 12,2,0,0).
Again, with (7) it then simply follows that condition 3 of Theorem 4.4 is satisfied.
To complete this paper we give the BG-index for the example used throughout section
2.
Example 5.2 Consider Lhe hierarchically structured population (N, S) given in Ex-
ample 2.4 whose echelon trees are given in Example 2.8. The BG-index of (N, S) is
given by:
BG(.,s) - (22, 2,1,1,o,o).
The BG-indices of the echelon trees (N,Tr) and (N,TZ) respectively are given by:
BG(-, Tr) - (3, 0,1,1, 0, 0) and BG(., T2) - (2,1, 1, 1, 0, 0).28
The only agents that have potential successors with rnore than one potential predeces-
sor are the agents 1 and 2. In table 2 we give the values of tk(i), i E{ 1, 2}, k E{1, 2},
and the probability distributions representing the expectations about the occurrence
of the echelon trees of agents 1 and 2 in the case they have pessimistic, neutral or
optimistic expectations. Both Theorem 3.3 and Theorem 4.4 easily can be verified
using this table.
6 Proofs of the theorems of section 2
ln order to prove 'I'hcorem 2.2 we first prove some lemrna's. Let S E SN. We
introduce an auxiliary mapping H: N U{0} --. 2N, which recursively is defined as
follows
H(0) :- 0,
and for every k E N
tI(k) :- {i E N ~ S(i) C H(k - I)}.
Lemma 6.1 There ezists a finite numóer M E N such that:
1. H(k - 1) C H(k), H(k - 1) ~ H(k), for every 1 C k G M;
2. H(k) - N, for every k~ M.
PROOF
The proof of the lemma consists of a number of steps.
(a) For every k E N: H(k - 1) C tt(k).
We prove this assertion by induction. First note that by definition H(0) C
If(1).
Let k E N. Now assume LhaL 11(k - 1) C H(k).
Let i E ff(k), t.hen by definition
S(i) C ll(k - 1) C ll(k).
Thus i E H(k -~ 1), and therefore H(k) C H(k ~- 1).29
(b) For every i, j E N it holds that
j E S(i) ~ ~S(j) G ~S(i).
Let i, j E N with j E S(i). Then by definition for every k E N it holds that
Sk(j) C Sktl(i). Hence,
~
S(J) C ~ Sk(i) C S(i).
(c)
k-2
But j E S(i) ~ S(j) and thus S(j) ~ S(i). This implies the assertion.
For every i E N: i E H(~S(i) -~ 1).
Let i E N. We prove the claim by induction on ~S(í).
First we suppose that ~S(i) - 0, i.e., S(i) - 0. So, 0- S(i) C H(0), which
implies that i E H(1).
Let k E N. Next assume that for all j E N with ~S(j) C k- 1 the claim is
true, i.e., j E fl(~S(j) t 1). Furt,hermore, suppose that ~.S(i) - k. Then by
(b) it holds that ~,S(j) C k- I for every j E S(i). Thus for every j E S(i) by
(a) it holds that j E H(~.S(J) f I) C ll (k) aud so S(i) C ll ( k). By definitiou
this implies that i E H(k f 1) - H(~S(i) f 1).
We introduce the function r: N--~ N, which for every i E N is given by
r(i) :- min{k ~ i E H(k)}.
By (c) it is clear that r is a well defined function, i.e., for every player i E N r(i)
exists and is a finite number. Furthermore, by definition for every k E N: H(k) -
{i E N ~ r(i) C k}.
Now we take M:- max{r(i) ~ i E N}.
l3y the statetnents as proved abovc it is obvious that for evcry I C k C M it holds
that H(k - 1) C H(k) and that for every k 1 M it holds that N(k) - N. Thereforc
it is left to prove that for every 1 C k C M it holds that H(k - 1) ~ II(k). This is
done in the following two steps.
(d) For every i, j E N with j E S(i) it holds that r(j) G r(i).
By definition i E H(r(i)). Hence, j E S(i) C H(r(i) - 1). This shows that
r(j) G r(i) - 1.30
(e) For every i E N with r(i) ) 2 there is some j E N such that j E S(i) and
r(j) - r(i) - 1.
By (d) it holds that for every j E S(i): r(j) C k- 1, where k- r(i). Suppose
by contradiction that for every j E S(i) it holds that r(j) C k- 2.
Then S(i) C H(k-2) and so i E H(k-1), which is impossible by the definition
of the functíon r.
We complete the proof of the lemma by remarking that (e) implies that for e very
2 C k C M it holds that H(k - 1) ~ H(k).
It remains to prove that H(1) ~ H(0) - 0. Suppose, by contradiction, that H(1) - 1~.
Hence, there are no players i E N with S(i) - 0, i.e., for every i E N: S(i) ~(D.
Now we construct a sequence ( ik)kEN in N as follows. First, choose il E N arbitrarily.
Then, recursively, choose ikf~ E S(ik), k E N. We claim that this sequence is infinite.
Namely, for every m E N it holds that for every k~ m f 1: ik E S(im). By acyclicity
of the successor mapping S it is clear that therefore all elements in the sequence have
to be distinct. Hence, the sequence has to consist of an infinite number of distinct
elements, and so the set of players N has to be infinite. This contradicts the finiteness
of N.
This completes the proof of the lemma.
Q.E.D.
With Lemma 6.1 we can derive that the mapping H describes a hierarchy with a
finite number of levels. These levels are precisely the echelons Lk, 1 c k C M, as
introduced in the mairi text as the following lemma shows.




From (1) and the definition of the mapping H it follows that ~J I,p - H(k - 1) and
p-1
thus for all k E N
Lk -{i E N~ H(k - 1) ~ S(i) C H(k - 1)}
-{i E N~ H(k - 1) ~ i E H(k)}
- H(k) ~ H(k - 1)
Then31
i. Uk~ Lk - UM~ rl(k) ~ H(k -1) - H(M) ~ II(o) - N;
2. Let 1 G k~ l C Ni. Without loss of generality we assume that k C l. Then
H(k-1) C H(~) C II(l-1) C H(l). This impliesthat (H(l)`II(l-1)]nH(k) -
0. With this it follows that L,~ n L, -[H(k) `H(k - 1)] n [H(l) `H(l - 1)] - 0;
3. Because H(k) ~ H(k - 1) it holds that Lk ~ 0 for all 1 L k C M.
This proves the lemma.
Q.E.D.
Lemma 6.3 There is a unique agent io E N jor whom S-1(io) -~. This agent io is
the unique agent in N jor whom S(io) - N`{io}.
PROOF
First we remark that there is at most one player io E N for whom it holds that
S(io) - N` {io}. Furthermore, there exists at least one player j E N for whom it
holds that S-'(j) - 0.t The lemma is now proved in two subsequent steps.
(a) For io E N it holds that S(io) - N`{io} if and only if ie is the unique player
for whom it holds that S-' (io) - 0.
Only if
Suppose that íor io E N it holds that S(io) - N` {io}. Assume, by contra-
diction, that S-~(io) ~ 0. Then there is some j E N such that io E S(j).
But then S(io) C S(j). Since j ~ io we must have j E S(io) C S(j), which
contradicts acyclicity of the successor mapping S.
Suppose that there is another player j E N for whom it holcls that S-'(j) - 0.
13y assuniption it holcís that j E S(io), i.e., j E Sk(io) for some k E N. I3ut
this means that S-t(j) ~~. Contradiction.
If
Suppose that in E N is the unique player such that S-~(io) -(~. Assume,
however, that S(ie) ~ N`{io}. '1'hen the set ,tí :- N`({io} U S(in)) is not
empty. Thus we may choose j E X for whom ~.5'(j) is ~naxiinal uver X.
Ily assuniption for j it holcls that S-~(7) ~ H, and so thc~re ~nust bc sonu~
tNote that for every i E N it holds that ~tS(i) c n. Now choosc. those i E N who maximizes the
number ~S(i). Clearly these players satisfy the property.32
h E N such that j E S(ii). This implies that ~S(h) )~S(j). So, h~.X.
But this means that either io - h or h E S(io).
The first case is excluded since then j E S(h) - S(ie) and, hence, j~ X.
'1'he second case implies that S(h) C S(io). But this irnplies also that j E
S(h) C S(io).
(b) There exists a player io E N such that S(io) - N`{io}.
Suppose, by conl radiction, that there is no player who satisfies this condition.
Then by (a) Lhere exist at least two players j, h E N, with j ~ h, such
that S-'(j) - S-1(h) -~. But this property prevents the possibility of
the existence of a player i E N such that {j, h} C S(i) U {i}. This is in
contradiction with the assurnpf,ions on the successor rnapping S as macle in
Definition 2.1.
Q.F,.D.
'I'heorem 2.2 now directly follows from the lemma's 6.2 and 6.3.
PROOF OF TREOREM 2.3
1. LetiELk, jEL~,lCk,lCM.
Only if
Suppose that i E S(j). Then, by definition of H it holds that i E S(j) C
H(l -]). This implies that k C l- 1.
If
Suppose that k C l. {i, j} E R implies that either i E S(j) or j E S(i). But if
j E S(i), then I c k c l. Thus i E S(j).
2. Let, i E Lk, 2 C k C M. Suppose that S(i) fl I,k-~ - 0. But then S(i) C
ll(k -'2). 'I'hus i~ l,k. Statc~mcnt 2 then follows wit.h statc,nu~nt ].
3. I.et i E I,k, 1 c k c M- 1. From Lemma 6.3 it follows that S-'(i) ~ 0.
Statement 3 then follows with statement 1.
Q.E.D.
PROOF OF LF,MMA 2.633
Let i; -{Lr, ..., LM } be the echelon partition of (N, S).
Suppose that i E L~, 1 C k C M- 1 and let io E Liy denote the topman within
the hierarchically structured population (N, S). From Theorem 2.3 it directly follows
that there exists at least one communication path between i and io satisfying the
condition stated in the lemma. Such a communication path can be found using the
following algorithm:
STEP 1 Let cr :- i, p:- 1. GOTO st,ep `l.
STEP 2 IF cy E Lti~ (i.e., cp - io), THEN (cl, ..., cfl) is a communication path
between i and io satisfying the condition stated in the lemma. STOP.
M-]




STEP 3 Let p:- p~- 1. GOTO step 2.
From the finiteness of ~ -{Ll, ..., I,,y} it follows that this algorithm always leads to
a communication path between i and io satisfying the condition stated in the lemma.
Suppose i E Lk, j E Lr, i~ j.
If {i, j} fl LM ~~ then it follows from the discussion above that there exists a
communication path between i and j satisíying the condition stated in the lemma.
Now suppose that {i, j} f1 L~y - l~. Then it follows froru thc discussion above that
thcrc cxists at lcast one communication path c-(cr - cr, . .., ch - io), 1 C h C M- k
betwcen i and io, and thc~re exists aL least one connnimication path d- (dp -
j, ..., dt - io), 1 C p C M- 1 between j and io satisfying the condition stated in
the lemma. Then it follows from 'Theorem 2.3 that at least one of the following three
situations holds:
1. There exists a communication path c- (C~ - i, ..., Ce - j, ..., ch - io) between
i and io such that j is part of that communication path and c~ E S(ckt1),
1 C k G h - 1. In this case (c~ - i, ..., c~ - j) is a communication path
between i and j satisfying the condition stated in the lemma.34
2. There exists a communication path d - (dp - j, ..., d~ - i, ... , dr - io)
between j and io such that i is part of that communication path and dkfr E
S(dk), 1 C k c p- 1. In this case (dy - j, . .. , d~ - i) is a communication
path between i and j satisfying the condition stated in the lemma.
3. There exists an agent t E LQ, with max{k,l} G q C M such that there exist
commrmication paths (cr - i, ..., ce - t, ..., ch - io) between i and io and
(dp - j, ..., d~ - t, ..., dr - io) between j and io such that ck E S(cr ~r ),
1 C k C h- 1 and dk~r E S(dk), 1 G k C p- 1. In this case (cr - i, ..., ce -
t- dt, ..., dv - j) is a conununication path between i and j satisfying the
condition statc~d in the lemrna.
Q.E.D.
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